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RATIONAL GROUPTHINK
MATAN HAREL1, ELCHANAN MOSSEL2, PHILIPP STRACK3, AND OMER TAMUZ4
Abstract. We study how long-lived rational agents learn from repeatedly observing each
others’ actions. We find that in the long run, information aggregation fails, and the fraction
of private information transmitted goes to zero as the number of agents gets large. With
Normal signals, in the long-run, agents learn less from observing the actions of any number
of other agents than they learn from seeing three other agents’ signals. We identify rational
groupthink—in which agents ignore their private signals and choose the same action for long
periods of time—as the cause of this failure of information aggregation.
1. Introduction
Recently, there has been a renewed interest in understanding social learning, i.e. the ability
of agents to learn by observing each others’ actions. The key question in this literature is how
well information is aggregated. As the analysis of the beliefs of long-lived Bayesian agents is
challenging (e.g., Cripps, Ely, Mailath, and Samuelson, 2008), most of this literature focuses
either on short-lived agents (e.g., Dasaratha et al., 2018; Mueller-Frank and Arieli, 2018) or
on non-rational belief dynamics such as the DeGroot model (see Golub and Jackson, 2010;
Jadbabaie et al., 2013) or quasi-Bayesian agents (see Molavi, Tahbaz-Salehi, and Jadbabaie,
2015).
By using new techniques from large deviation theory we are able to overcome the difficulty
associated with the analysis of Bayesian beliefs and manage to analyze social learning with
long-lived rational agents. Our main result is that social learning will fail for Bayesian
agents in a large society: An arbitrarily large group of Bayesian agents observing each
others’ actions will only learn as fast as a small group of agent observing each others’ signals
directly. For example, when signals are normal, 4 agents sharing their signals learn faster
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than a group of n agents who observe each others’ actions (but not signals). This failure of
information aggregation is caused by the endogenous correlation in the agents’ actions. As
it is well known a large number of correlated signals might convey less information than a
small number of independent signals.1
Whereas signals are independent, the agents’ actions become endogenously correlated.
This correlation is an immediate consequence of the incentive to learn from each others’
actions. For example, if agent 1 takes an action that is optimal in some state of the world
the other agents will infer that agent 1’s private belief indicates that this state is relatively
likely and will themselves take this action with greater probability. A greater number of
agents increases this correlation as agents share more common information. The (perhaps
surprising) insight of our analysis is that as the number of agents grows, the correlation
increases to an extent that completely out-weighs the gain of the additional independent
private signals. We show that asymptotically this failure of information aggregation holds
for any signal structure, any utility function and any number of agents.
What inference an agent draws from the actions of another agent depends on her belief
about the other agents’ beliefs. Thus, agents’ actions may depend on their higher order
beliefs. This poses a significant challenge for the exact characterization of behavior. We
circumvent this problem by focusing on long-term, asymptotic probabilities, and by analyzing
a phenomenon that we call “rational groupthink”. We loosely define rational groupthink to
be the event that all agents take the wrong action for many periods, despite all having
private signals that indicate otherwise. Importantly, this behavior arises in our model as a
consequence of Bayesian updating, and is not driven by an assumed desire for conformity.
Through a recursive argument we are able to estimate the asymptotic probability of rational
groupthink (see Subsection 4.3) and find that due to rational groupthink agents in a large
group learn almost as slowly as they do in autarky. Hence, in this sense, rational groupthink
prevents almost all information aggregation.2
Rational groupthink occurs after a consensus on an action is formed in the initial peri-
ods, making it optimal for every agent to continue taking the consensus action, even when
her private information indicates otherwise. Indeed, we show that typically, after a wrong
consensus forms, all agents quickly observe private signals which provide strong evidence for
choosing the correct action, and yet a long time may pass until any of them breaks the wrong
consensus (Proposition 1). Thus a situation arises in which each agent’s private information
1This point has been made for example by Clemen and Winkler (1985).
2Our prediction seems to be in line with the findings in the empirical literature: Da and Huang (2016, page
5) find in a study on forecasters “that private information may be discarded when a user places weights on
the prior forecasts [of others]. In particular, errors in earlier forecasts are more likely to persist and appear
in the final consensus forecast, making it less efficient.”
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indicates the correct action, and yet, because of the group dynamics, all agents choose the
wrong action. We thus find the name rational groupthink to be an apt description.
We study the effect of increasing the group size. On the one hand, with more agents,
each individual agent is less likely to break a wrong consensus. On the other hand, the
number of potential dissenters is larger, and so a priori it is not obvious whether rational
groupthink becomes more or less likely. We show that the inefficiency (measured as the
share of information that is lost) associated with the rational groupthink effect becomes
arbitrarily large as the size of the group increases. Our first main result shows that, even as
the number of agents goes to infinity, the speed of learning from actions stays bounded by a
constant (Theorem 1), whereas the speed of learning from the aggregated signals, which is
proportional to the number of agents, goes to infinity (Fact 2). Thus, in a large group, almost
no information is aggregated; the agents’ belief when observing only actions has the same
precision as would result from observing a vanishingly small fraction of the available private
signals. Specifically, for Normal signals, a group of n agents observing each others’ actions
learns asymptotically slower than a group of 4 agents who share their private signals; this
holds for any number of agents! Hence, at most a fraction of 4/n of the private information is
transmitted through actions (Corollary 1). We proceed beyond Normal signals to show that
for any signal distribution at most a fraction of c/n of the private information is transmitted
through actions, for some constant c that depends only on the distribution of the private
signals (Proposition 2).
As a robustness test, we complement our results on the asymptotic rate by an analysis of
the exact probability with which the wrong action is chosen in a given period for Normal
signals. We study a canonical setting of a large group of agents with Normal private signals,
where, as the size of the group is increased, the total precision of their signals is kept
constant. Our second main result shows that in this setting, our asymptotic finding—that
for large groups almost no information is aggregated through actions as a consequence of
rational groupthink—holds starting already from the second period. We show that in every
period the probability with which an agent chooses the correct action when she observes
others converges (as the number of agents goes to infinity) to the probability with which she
would choose the correct action if she could only observe the actions taken by others in the
first period (Theorem 2). Thus, information fails to aggregate not only asymptotically, but
already after the first period.
An important advantage of asymptotic rates is that they are tractable. Beyond this, we
show that asymptotic rates have the advantage of being independent of many details of the
model, providing a measure that is robust to changes in model parameters such as the agents’
3
prior or the exact utility function. For similar reasons of tractability and robustness, many
previous works have studied asymptotic (long run) rates of learning in various settings.3
Most of the preceding literature studies situations where each agent observes a single
signal and agents try to infer the others’ signals from repeatedly observing their actions.
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982); Sebenius and Geanakoplos (1983); Parikh and Krasucki
(1990); Mossel et al. (2015) give conditions under which agents actions agree in the long-run.
Rosenberg, Solan, and Vieille (2009) also study agreement, in a more general social learning
setting. The question of how well information is aggregated in such settings was considered
in an important paper by Vives (1993), who studies rate at which information is aggregated
through noisy prices.
In contrast to this literature we allow for agents to repeatedly observe signals about the
state of the world. The only other articles which we are aware of that tackle this problem are
Jadbabaie et al. (2013) and Molavi et al. (2015). Both study asymptotic rates of learning
under (non-rational) linear belief updating rules in complex observational networks. The
focus of both papers differs from ours: Jadbabaie et al. (2013) and Molavi et al. (2015) allow
for complex network structures, but impose simple linear belief updating rules. In contrast,
we study the complexities associated with Bayesian learning, but assume that all actions are
commonly known. Interestingly, our results contrast the findings of Jadbabaie et al. (2013)
and Molavi et al. (2015); while in their model information is efficiently aggregated, in our
model it is not. This is a consequence of the difference in the rationality assumptions.
Gale and Kariv (2003) use numerical methods to characterize the asymptotic rates with
which rational agents learn, and emphasize the importance of understanding the rates at
which Bayesian agents learn from each other.4
Our work is also related to models of rational herding (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch,
1992; Banerjee, 1992), as we use the same conditional i.i.d. structure of signals, and utilities
depend only on one’s own actions and the state. The crucial difference is that in herding
models each agent acts only once, whereas in our model agents take actions repeatedly. We
thus show that the failure of information aggregation is not particular to sequential models
in which agents act only once, but more generally extends to situations of repeated inter-
actions. Our main finding, the rational groupthink effect, has no analogue in sequential
herding models, since, in these models, once a herd starts, it is not true that every agent’s
3Examples of papers studying the rate of learning are Vives (1993); Chamley (2004); Duffie and Manso
(2007); Duffie, Malamud, and Manso (2009); Duffie, Giroux, and Manso (2010). Asymptotic rates also
have been studied in other settings in which it is difficult to analyze the short-term dynamics (e.g.,
Hong and Shum, 2004; Ho¨rner and Takahashi, 2016). Jadbabaie et al. (2013) and Molavi et al. (2015) study
the rate of learning in an almost identical setting, with boundedly rational agents.
4Gale and Kariv (2003, p.20): “Speeds of convergence can be established analytically in simple cases. For
more complex cases, we have been forced to use numerical methods. The computational difficulty of solving
the model is massive even in the case of three persons [...] This is an important subject for future research.”
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private signal indicates the correct action. In our model we show that this happens, in the
long run, with high probability.
Potential applications of our results appear in settings in which agents repeatedly learn
from each other. These include the dissemination of information in developing countries
(e.g., Conley and Udry (2010); Banerjee et al. (2013) among many studies), the adoption of
opinions on social networks, and prediction markets where forecasters observe the forecasts
of others (see Da and Huang (2016)).
2. Setup
Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. Each period, each agent i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
first observes a signal (or shock) sit ∈ R, takes an action ait ∈ A, and finally observes the
actions taken by others this period. The set of possible actions is finite: |A| <∞.
2.1. States and Signals. There is an unknown state
Θ ∈ {l, h}
randomly chosen by nature, with probability p0 = P [Θ = h] ∈ (0, 1). Signals sit are i.i.d,
across agents i and over time t, conditional on the state Θ, with distribution µΘ. The
distributions µh and µl are mutually absolutely continuous
5 and hence no signal perfectly
reveals the state. As a consequence the log-likelihood ratio of every signal
ℓit = log
dµh
dµl
(sit)
is well defined (i.e., |ℓit| <∞) and we assume that it has finite expectation |E [ℓit] | <∞. We
also assume that priors are generic6, so as to avoid the expository overhead of treating cases
in which the agents are indifferent between actions; the results all hold even without this
assumption.
Our signal structure allows for bounded as well as unbounded likelihoods.7 Our main
example is that of Normal signals sit ∼ N (mθ, σ2) with mean mθ depending on the state
and variance σ2. Another example is that of binary signals sit ∈ {l, h} which are equal to
the state with constant probability P [sit = Θ | Θ] = φ > 1/2.
5That is, every event with positive probability under one measure has positive probability under the other.
6That is, chosen from a Lebesgue measure one subset of [0, 1].
7In the herding literature agents either learn or do not learn the state, depending on whether private sig-
nals have bounded likelihood ratios (Smith and Sørensen, 2000). In our model, the distinction between
unbounded and bounded private signals is not important, since the aggregate of each agent’s private infor-
mation suffices to learn the state.
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2.2. Actions and Payoffs. Agent i’s payoff (or utility) in period t depends on her action
ait and next period’s signal s
i
t+1, and is given by u(s
i
t+1, a
i
t) .
8 The signal can be interpreted
as a shock (like demand or interest rate) which influences the payoffs of the different actions
of the agent. Note that u(·, ·) does not depend on the agent’s identity i or the time period
t. This model is equivalent to a model where the agent’s utility u¯(Θ, ait) is unobserved
and depends directly on the state. Formally, we can translate the model where the utility
depends on the signal into the model where it depends on the state by setting it equal to
the expected payoff conditional on the state θ9
u¯(h, α) := Eh
[
u(sit+1, α)
]
u¯(l, α) := El
[
u(sit+1, α)
]
.
We denote by aθ the action that maximizes the flow payoff in state θ, which we assume is
unique
αθ := argmax
α∈A
u¯(θ, α) .
We call αh, αl the certainty actions and assume that they are distinct (i.e., αh 6= αl), as
otherwise the problem is trivial.
It is an important feature of this model that externalities are purely informational, i.e.,
each agent’s utility is independent of the others’ actions, and hence agents care about oth-
ers’ actions only because they may provide information. Furthermore, private signals are
independent of actions, and so agents have no experimentation motive; they learn the same
information from their signals, irregardless of the actions that they take.
2.3. Agents’ Behavior. We assume throughout that agents are Bayesian and myopic: they
completely discount future payoffs, and thus at every time period choose the action that
maximizes the expected payoff at that period. In this repeated action setting there may be a
strategic incentive to change ones own action in order to gain more information from future
actions of others. This effect does not exist for rational myopic agents, and we make this
assumption for tractability, as does most of the learning literature.10 A possible justification
8Note, that observing the utility u(sit+1, a
i
t) does not provide any information beyond the signal s
i
t+1 and
therefore past signals (si1, . . . , s
i
t+1) are a sufficient statistic for the private information available to agent i
when taking an action in period t+ 1.
9Throughout, we denote by Eθ [·] := E [· | Θ = θ] and Pθ [·] := P [· | Θ = θ] the expectation and probability
conditional on the state.
10Indeed, the same choice is made in most of the learning literature (where signals are private and agents
interact repeatedly) either explicitly (e.g., Sebenius and Geanakoplos, 1983; Parikh and Krasucki, 1990;
Bala and Goyal, 1998; Keppo et al., 2008), or implicitly, by assuming that there is a continuum of agents
(e.g., Vives, 1993; Gale and Kariv, 2003; Duffie and Manso, 2007; Duffie et al., 2009, 2010).
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for this approach is that reasoning about the informational effect of one’s actions in such
setups requires a level of sophistication that seems unrealistic in many applications.11
We denote by pit the posterior probability that agent i assigns to the event Θ = h at the
beginning of period t. As an agent’s posterior belief pit is a sufficient statistic for her expected
payoff, her action ait depends only on p
i
t. Formally, there exists a function a
⋆ : [0, 1] → A
such that with probability one12
ait = a
⋆(pit) .
As information arrives independently of actions, and because agents are myopic, our model
is not one of strategic experimentation: there are incentives to change one’s action in order
to learn more from one’s own future signals, or from others’ future actions. With these
potentially confounding effect removed, we are left with a distilled model that allows us to
study how observing others’ actions differs from observing their signals.
2.4. Information. Each agent observes only her own signals, and not the signals of others.
To learn about the state, agents try to infer the signals of others from their actions. More
precisely, at the end of each period an agent observes the actions taken by all other agents
in this period.
2.5. Examples.
2.5.1. Matching the State. A simple example which suffices to understand all the economic
results of the paper is the case of two actions A = {l, h} where the agent’s expected utility
equals one if she matches the state, i.e.
u¯(θ, α) =

1 if α = θ0 if α 6= θ .
In this case the agent simply takes the action to which her posterior belief assigns higher
probability:
ait =

h if p
i
t >
1
2
l otherwise
.
2.5.2. Monopolistic Sellers. As an application, consider local monopolistic sellers who want
to learn about the demand for their product and the associated optimal price. Each seller
acts in a different market, so that there are no payoff externalities. The distribution of
demand, however, is the same, so that the realized demand in other markets is informative
about future demands in a seller’s home market.
11We conjecture that all our results generalize to the case of non-myopic agents, but this extension requires
substantial technical innovation, beyond the techniques developed in this paper.
12We here say “with probability one” only to rule out the zero probability event that the agent is indifferent.
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For concreteness, assume that the sellers are shop owners who are selling a new product,
and that in the high state the number of people entering the store to inquire about the
product is Poisson with mean ρh, while in the low state it is Poisson with mean ρl, which is
less than ρh. After learning the price each customer decides whether or not to buy, depending
on her private valuation. Customers’ private valuations for the product are independent of
the state, and so, after having entered the store, customers reveal no new information about
the state. Thus, the information a seller learns about the state from her own customers is
independent of the price she sets.
When marginal profits are not constant in the volume of sales, a seller will want to set
one price if the state is high, another price if the state is low, and potentially intermediate
prices when she is unsure about the state. Consequently, each seller wants to learn the state
and does so not only by observing the demand in her store, but also by observing the prices
set by other sellers.
3. Results
In this section we describe our results; section 4 derives the learning dynamics in detail
and explains how they lead to the results of this section. We consider the probability with
which an agent i takes a suboptimal action in period t:
ait 6= αΘ .
We refer to this event as agent i “making a mistake” by “choosing the wrong action”, even
though she takes the action which is optimal given her information. As a benchmark we first
briefly discuss the classical single agent case.
3.1. Autarky. In the single agent case n = 1, the probability of a suboptimal action is
known to decay exponentially, with a rate ra that can be calculated explicitly in terms of
the cumulant generating functions λh(z) = − log Eh
[
e−z ℓ
]
and λl(z) := − log El
[
ez ℓ
]
:13
Fact 1 (Speed of learning in autarky). The probability that a single agent in autarky chooses
the wrong action in period t satisfies14
(1) P
[
at 6= αΘ
]
= e−ra·t+o(t) ,
where
ra := sup
z≥0
λh(z) = sup
z≥0
λl(z).
13Here ℓ is a random variable with a distribution that is equal to that of any of the log-likelihood ratios ℓit.
The definition of the cumulant generating function differs by a sign from the usual one.
14Here, and elsewhere, we write o(t) to mean a lower order term. Formally a function f : R→ R is in o(t) if
limt→∞ f(t)/t = 0.
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This type of autarky result is classical in the statistics literature and can be found, for
example, in studies of Bayesian hypothesis testing; see, e.g. Cover and Thomas (2006, pages
314-316). For us it serves as a benchmark for the case when agents try to learn from the
actions of others. We prove Fact 1 in the Appendix, for the convenience of the reader.
Note, that the long-run probability of a mistake is independent of set of actions A and the
utility function u. It is also independent of the prior. Thus quantifying the speed of learning
using the exponential rate has both advantages and disadvantages: the rate is independent
of many details of the model and depends only on the private signal distributions. It is
also tractable and can be explicitly calculated for many distributions. However, it is an
asymptotic measure and in general does not say anything formally about what happens in
early periods. Of course, the same is true for many statistical results, like the Central Limit
Theorem, which nevertheless provide helpful intuition about what happens in finite periods.
3.2. Many agents. We now turn to the case where there are n ≥ 2 agents. We first
consider the benchmark case where all signals are observed by all agents. Since there is no
private information, all agents hold the same beliefs, and this case reduces to the single agent
case, but where n signals are observed in every period. After t periods the agents will have
observed n · t signals, and so, by Fact 1, their probability of taking the wrong action will be
the probability of error after n · t periods in the autarky setting.
Fact 2 (Speed of learning with public signals). When signals are public, the probability that
any agent i chooses the wrong action in period t satisfies
P
[
ait 6= αΘ
]
= e−n ra·t+o(t).
Having considered this benchmark case, we turn to our main model, in which n ≥ 2 agents
observe each others’ actions, but signals are private. Our main result is that for any number
of agents the speed of learning is bounded from above by a constant:
Theorem 1. Suppose n agents all observe each others’ past actions. Given the private signal
distributions, there exists a constant r¯b > 0 such that for any number of agents
P
[
ait 6= αΘ
] ≥ e−r¯b·t+o(t).
In particular, this holds for r¯b = min {Eh [ℓ] ,−El [ℓ]}. When private signals are Normal then
one can take r¯b = 4ra.
An immediate corollary from Theorem 1 and Fact 2 is the following result.
Corollary 1. There exists a fixed group size k such that for any arbitrarily large group size
n, the probability that any agent chooses the wrong action is eventually lower with k agents
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and public signals than with n agents and private signals. When signals are Normal we can
take k = 4.
Thus adding more agents (and with them more private signals and more information)
cannot boost the speed of learning past some bound, and as n tends to infinity more and
more of the information is lost. In the case of normal signals r¯b = 4 ra, and thus, regardless
of the number of agents, the probability of mistake is eventually higher than it would be if
4 agents shared their private signals. Thus for large groups almost all of the private signals
are effectively lost, i.e. not aggregated in the decisions of others.
3.2.1. Rational groupthink. To prove this theorem we calculate the asymptotic probability
of the event that all agents choose the wrong certainty action in almost all time periods up
to time t. We call this event “rational groupthink” and show that its probability is already
high, which implies that the probability that one particular agent errs at time t is also high.
Intuitively, when a wrong consensus forms by chance in the beginning, it is hard to break
and can last for a long time, with surprisingly high probability. This is due to the fact that
agents require their private signals to be relatively strong in order to choose a dissenting
action.
In fact, conditioned on rational groupthink, it holds, with high probability, that the private
signals of each agent, which initially indicated the wrong action, eventually strongly indicate
the correct action, but are still ignored due to the overwhelming information provided by
the actions of others. We thus find the term rational groupthink an apt description of the
phenomenon. We formally express this in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the long run, conditional on the state being high and all agents taking the
incorrect, low certainty action in every period, the private signals of every agent indicate
the correct, high certainty action. That is, for every agent i and ε > 0 it holds that
lim
t→∞
Ph
[
qti > 1− ε | ajs = αl for all s ≤ t and all j
]
= 1,
where qti = P [Θ = h | si1, . . . , sit] is the probability assigned to the high state given only agent
i’s signals.
The analogous statement holds in the low state.
Note that Proposition 1 is not a consequence of the law of large numbers, as conditional on
taking the wrong action the distribution of signals is not independent. Indeed, the result of
Proposition 1 does not hold in the single agent case, where—in sharp contrast—conditional
on choosing the wrong action the agent holds wrong beliefs. It shows that in a multi-
agent learning problem agents will (with high probability) have received correct signals
even conditioned on choosing the wrong action. This phenomenon, which does not have an
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analogue in sequential herding models, seems striking, as it does not involve irrationality, and
yet results in a group taking an action which contradicts each and every member’s private
information.
3.2.2. Early Period Mistake Probabilities. Theorem 1 is a statement about asymptotic rates.
In fact, if one were to increase the number of agents while holding the private signal dis-
tributions fixed, the probability of the agents choosing correctly at any given period t > 1
approaches 1. Thus, a more interesting setting is one in which, as we increase the number
of agents, we decrease the informativeness of each agent’s signal, while keeping fixed the
amount of information available to all agents together.
We consider n agents who each receive Normal private signals with fixed conditional means
±1 and variance n. If such signals were publicly observable they would be informationally
equivalent to a single Normal signal with variance 1 each period. In this setting, Theorem 1
implies that the speed of learning would be inversely proportional to the size of society, and
in particular would tend to zero as n tends to infinity.
To test the robustness of this asymptotic speed of learning result, we perform a detailed
analysis of the early periods, showing that, as the number of agents increases, they learn less
and less from each other’s actions. Thus, the asymptotic result of Theorem 1, which stated
that the agents learn little from each other’s actions in the long run, “kicks in” early on (in
fact, already in the second period), in the sense that with high probability the agents learn
nothing from each other’s actions after the first period.
Theorem 2. Suppose n agents have normal private signals with conditional distributions
N (±1, n) and want to match the state15, so that u¯(θ, a) = 1{a=θ}. Then, for every t, the
probability that all agents in the periods {2, 3, . . . , t} choose the action that the majority of
the agents chose in period 1 converges to one as n goes to infinity.
Thus the private signals of periods {2, . . . , t} are with high probability not strong enough
to induce a deviation from the first period consensus. Consequently, the actions in these
periods are correct only if the action taken by the majority in the first period is correct.
This probability is bounded by Φ(1) ∼ 0.84 for any n. Of course, this probability can be
arbitrarily close to 1/2 if the private signal distributions have a larger variance. In this case,
almost all information is lost even in early periods, if the number of agents is sufficiently
high.
The intuition behind this result is the following: after observing the first round actions,
the probability that a particular agent will have a strong enough signal to deviate from
the majority opinion (action) is small. In fact, it is so small that the probability that no
15See Section 2.5.1.
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agent deviates is almost one, and moreover it takes many periods until any agent has a
strong enough signal to deviate. When agents observe that no one has deviated, it further
strengthens (if not by much) their belief in the majority opinion, thus again delaying the
breaking of the consensus. Of course, when the initial consensus is wrong, eventually it is
broken.
4. Learning Dynamics
In this section we analyze the learning dynamics in detail and explain how we prove the
results of Section 3. We discuss how agents interpret each other’s actions and how they choose
their own. The analysis of these learning dynamics is related to questions in random walks
and large deviations theory. Proving our results requires some mathematical innovation,
which we view as a contribution of this paper.
4.1. Preliminaries. As an agent’s expected utility for a given action is linear in her pos-
terior belief pit, the set of beliefs where she takes a given action is an interval. It will be
convenient to define the agent’s log-likelihood ratio (LLR) Lit := log p
i
t/(1 − pit). As the
LLR is a monotone transformation of the agent’s posterior belief, and as a myopic agent’s
action is determined by her posterior, the same holds true in terms of LLRs. This can be
summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. There exist disjoint intervals (L(α), L(α)) ⊂ R∪{−∞,+∞}, one for each action
α ∈ A, such that, with probability one, ait = α if and only if Lit ∈ (L(α), L(α)).
To characterize the agent’s actions it thus suffices to characterize her LLR. Note, that for
the certainty action αl it holds that L(αl) = −∞, and that analogously L(αh) = +∞.
4.2. Autarky. As a benchmark, we first describe the classical autarky setting where a single
agent acts by himself. In this section we omit the superscript signifying the agent.
Evolution of Beliefs. In autarky, the posterior probability the agent assigns to the high state
before taking an action in period t is Pt = P [θ = h | s1, . . . , st]. Applying Bayes’ rule yields
that the LLR Lt follows a random walk with increments ℓt = log
dµh
dµl
(st) equal to the LLR
of the signals the agent observed:
(2) Lt = L0 +
t∑
τ=1
ℓτ .
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Probability of Mistakes. As a consequence of Lemma 1, the probability that the agent chooses
the wrong action in period t when the state equals θ is given by
Pθ
[
at 6= αθ
]
=

Ph
[
Lt ≤ L(αh)
]
if θ = h
Pl
[
Lt ≥ L(αl)
]
if θ = l
.(3)
Hence, to calculate the probability of a mistake one needs to calculate the probability that the
LLR is in a given interval. By (2) the LLR is the sum of increments which are i.i.d. conditional
on the state, and hence (Lt)t is a random walk.
The short-run probability that a random walk is within a given interval is hard to cal-
culate and depends very finely on the distribution of its increments.16 As this makes it
impossible—even in the single agent case—to obtain any general results on the probability
that the agent makes a mistake, we focus on the long-run probability of mistakes, which can
be analyzed for general signal structures. The long-run behavior of random walks has been
studied in large deviations theory, with one of the earliest results due to Crame´r (1944), who
studied these questions in the context of calculating premiums for insurers. We will use some
of the ideas and tools from this theory in our analysis; a self-contained introduction is given
in Appendix A for the convenience of the reader.
Beliefs. We define the private LLR Rt as the LLR calculated based only on an agent’s private
signals:
Rt := L0 +
t∑
τ=1
ℓτ .
In the single agent case the private signals are all the available information, so Lt = Rt, but
this will no longer be the case once we consider more agents. Regardless of the number of
agents and the information available to them, the private LLR is a random walk with steps
ℓt, if we condition on the state. We can therefore use large deviation theory to estimate the
probability that the private LLR Rt deviates from its expectation, conditional on the state.
To this end, let ℓ have the same distribution as each ℓt, define λθ : R → R, the cumulant
generating function of the increments of the LLR in state θ by
λh(z) := − log Eh
[
e−z ℓ
]
λl(z) := − log El
[
ez ℓ
]
,
and denote its Fenchel conjugate by
λ⋆θ(η) := sup
z≥0
λθ(z)− η · z.
16The only exception are a few cases where the distribution of the LLR Lt is known in closed form for every
t, such as the Normal case. Even in the Normal case it seems to us intractable to calculate in closed form
the mistake probability in early periods in the multi-agent case.
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Given these definition, we are ready to state the basic classical large deviations estimate
that we use in this paper.
Lemma 2. For any El [ℓ] < η < Eh [ℓ] it holds that
17
Ph [Rt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] = e−λ⋆h(η)·t+o(t)
Pl [Rt ≥ η · t+ o(t)] = e−λ⋆l (−η)·t+o(t).
This Lemma states that the probability that the random walk Rt deviates from its (con-
ditional) expectation is exponentially small, and decays with a rate that can be calculated
exactly in terms of λ⋆h or λ
⋆
l . The proof of Lemma 2 in the Appendix uses the properties of
λθ and λ
⋆
θ to verify that the increments of the LLR process in both states are such that large
deviation theory results are applicable. Lemma 2 allows us to calculate the probability of a
mistake conditional on each state, immediately implying Fact 1, which states that18
P
[
at 6= αΘ
]
= e−ra·t+o(t) ,
where ra = λ
⋆
h(0) = λ
⋆
l (0).
4.3. Many Agents and the Groupthink Effect. In this section we consider n ≥ 2 agents.
Each agent observes a sequence of private signals si1, . . . , s
i
t, and the action taken by other
agents in previous periods (ajτ )τ<t,j 6=i. In this setting we prove Theorem 1. As before, we
consider myopic agents who completely discount future payoffs, and thus at each period
choose the action that maximizes their expected payoffs at that period. For example, in the
“matching the state” setting (Section 2.5.1), the agents’ actions will be given by
ait =

h if P [Θ = h | (s
i
τ )τ≤t, (a
j
τ )τ<t, j 6=i] >
1
2
l otherwise
.
The Probability that All Agents Make a Mistake in Every Period. To bound the probability
of mistake, we consider the event Gt that all agents choose the action α
l in all time periods
up to t:
Gt = ∩ni=1 ∩tτ=1
{
aiτ = α
l
}
.
17Here each o(t) denotes a different function, so that the first line can be alternatively written as follows: For
every f(·) with limt→∞ f(t)/t = 0 there exists a g(·) with limt→∞ g(t)/t = 0 such that Ph [Rt ≤ η · t+ f(t)] =
e−λ
⋆
h
(η)·t+g(t).
18We note that it is possible to strengthen this result by replacing the lower order o(t) term by O(log(t))
using the Bahadur-Rao exact asymptotics method (see Dembo and Zeitouni (1998, Pages 110-113) for a
detailed derivation). However, such precision will provide little additional economic insight while significantly
complicating the proofs, and thus we will not pursue it.
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To simplify the exposition we assume in the main text that Gt has strictly positive prob-
ability.19 Conditioned on Θ = h, the event Gt is the event that all the agents are, and
always have been, in unanimous agreement on the wrong action αl. We thus call Gt the
rational groupthink event. The event Gt implies that all agents made a mistake in period t,
conditioned on Θ = h. Thus calculating the probability of Gt will provide a lower bound on
the probability that a particular agent makes a mistake.
This event can be written as G1t ∩ · · · ∩Gnt , where Git is the event that agent i chooses the
wrong action αl in every period τ ≤ t. To calculate the probability of Gt, it would of course
have been convenient if these n events were independent, conditioned on Θ. However, due to
the fact that the agents’ actions are strongly intertwined, these events are not independent;
given that agent 1 played the action αl—which is optimal in the low state—in all previous
time periods, agent 2 assigns a higher probability to the low state and is more likely to also
play the same action. This poses a difficulty for the analysis of this model, which is a direct
consequence of the fact that the agents’ actions are intricately dependent on their higher
order beliefs.
Decomposition in Independent Events. Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out that Gt can never-
the-less be written as the intersection of conditionally independent events. We now describe
how this can be done.
Lemma 3. There exists a sequence of thresholds (qτ )τ such that the event Gt equals the
event that no agent’s private LLR Ri hits the threshold q before period t
Gt =
n⋂
i=1
{Riτ ≤ qτ for all τ ≤ t} .
The proof of Lemma 3 in Appendix C shows this result recursively. Intuitively, whenever
Gt−1 occurs, all agents took the action αl up to time t− 1. By the induction hypothesis this
implies that the private LLR of all other agents was below the threshold qτ in all previous
periods. As conditional on the states the private LLR’s of different agents are independent,
whether agent i takes the action αl at time t conditional on Gt−1, depends only on her
private LLR Rit. As α
l is the most extreme action it follows that the set of private LLRs
where the agent takes the action αl must be a half-infinite interval and is thus characterized
by a threshold qτ . By symmetry, this is the same threshold for all agents.
19This is the case, for example, if the prior is not too extreme relative to the maximal possible private signal
strength, or if the private signals are unbounded. Otherwise, it may be the case that agents never take the
wrong certainty action in some initial periods, for example if the prior is extreme and the private signals are
weak. In Appendix C we drop this assumption, slightly change the definition of Gt, and formally show that
all our results also hold in general.
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Calculating the Thresholds. We now provide a sketch of the argument (omitting many tech-
nical details) which we use in the appendix to characterize the threshold qt. The threshold
qt admits a simple interpretation: it determines how high a private LLR R
i
t an agent must
have in order to break from the consensus, and not take action αl at time t, after having
seen everyone take it so far. To calculate the qt’s we consider agent j’s decision problem at
time t + 1, conditioned on Gt. The information available to her is her own private signals
(summarized in her private log-likelihood ratio Rjt+1), and in addition the fact that all other
agents have chosen αl up to this point. But the latter observation is equivalent to knowing
that all the other agent’s private log-likelihood ratios have been under the thresholds qτ in
all previous time periods. Formally, knowing Gt is equivalent to knowing that
W it := {Riτ ≤ qτ for all τ ≤ t}
has occurred for all agents i 6= j.
How does knowing that agent i’s private LLR has been below qτ in all previous periods
(i.e. W it occurred) influence agent j’s posterior? To answer this question we consider the
log-likelihood ratio induced by this event:
(4) log
Ph [W
i
t ]
Pl [W
i
t ]
·
We show in Proposition 5 in the appendix that the logarithm of the probability of the
event W it conditioned on Θ = h is asymptotically the same as that of the event R
i
t ≤ qt, i.e.,
the event that agent i’s private LLR is below the threshold qt at just the last period:
logPh
[
W it
] ≈ log Ph [Rit ≤ qt] .
Proposition 5 is similar in spirit to the Ballot Theorem of Bertrand (1887), which implies
that the probability that a random walk is below a constant threshold in all prior periods
approximately equals (up to sub-exponential terms) the probability that the random walk
is below this threshold in the last period. We generalize this result in Proposition 5 by
showing that the probability that a random walk is below a non-constant threshold (qt)t in
all prior periods asymptotically equals the probability that the random walk is below the
linear threshold q · t with slope q = lim inf t qt/t equal to the infimum of the slopes of the
original threshold. This proposition is not an established large deviations result, but rather
a contribution of this paper.
In Proposition 7 in the appendix we show that qt is in fact asymptotically linear, i.e. the
limit q = limt→∞ qt/t exists. This implies that log Ph [W it ] = log Ph [R
i
t ≤ qt] + o(t). Thus, the
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large deviations estimate given in Lemma 2 implies that
(5) log Ph
[
W it
]
= log Ph
[
Rit ≤ qt
]
+ o(t) = log Ph
[
Rit ≤ q · t
]
+ o(t) = −λ⋆h(q) · t+ o(t) .
In Lemma 7 in the Appendix we show that conditional on Θ = l, the probability of the event
W it that agent i takes the correct action α
l in every period is strictly positive, i.e. there
exists a constant C > 0 such that Pl [W
i
t ] ∈ [C, 1] for all t. Thus, the LLR induced by the
event W it is
log
Ph [W
i
t ]
Pl [W it ]
= log Ph
[
W it
]− logPl [W it ] = −λ⋆h(q) · t+ o(t).
Since the event Gt that the private LLR of every agent is below qτ in every period prior
to t is the intersection of the individual events Gt =
⋂n
i=1W
i
t , and since these events (W
i
t )i
are conditionally independent, we get that the log-likelihood ratio of Gt is simply a multiple
of the LLR of W 1t :
log
Ph [Gt]
Pl [Gt]
= −(n− 1) · λ⋆h(q) · t + o(t).
The factor here is n − 1 rather than n, since each agent observes only n − 1 others. Thus,
after observing Gt, agent j’s posterior log-likelihood ratio will be the sum of her private LLR
Rjt and the LLR induced by observing Gt
Ljt = R
j
t − (n− 1) · λ⋆h(q) · t+ o(t) .
By Lemma 1, agent j will therefore take the action αl in period t + 1 if her signal is below
(n− 1) · λ⋆h(q) · t+ o(t), which determines the new threshold qt+1.
Thus, the threshold for the rational groupthink event at time t+ 1 will be
qt+1 = (n− 1) · λ⋆h(q) · t + o(t).
Dividing by t and taking the limit as t tends to infinity yields that (Proposition 7)
(6) q = (n− 1) · λ⋆h(q).
Note that q depends only on the private signal distributions, through λ⋆h. Since λ
⋆
h is non-
negative and decreasing, this equation will always have a unique solution. We have thus
calculated q: it is the solution of the fixed point equation (6).
Intuitively, if the threshold is too high then it is likely that the others’ private LLRs are
below it, and so it is likely that they do not break the consensus. Thus an agent gains little
information from observing them agreeing with the consensus, and her threshold for breaking
the consensus will be low. This contradicts the initial assumption that the threshold is high.
Likewise, if the threshold is too low, then an agent learns a lot by observing the consensus
endure, and thus sets a high threshold for breaking it. The fixed point of (6) is the value in
which these effects are equal.
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Equation 6 determines the value of q, the slope of the threshold above which the agents
break the consensus. We can use (5) to determine the probability of the event W it that
agent i does not break the consensus. Using the facts that the rational groupthink event Gt
satisfies Gt =
⋂n
i=1W
i
t and that the W
i
t ’s are conditionally independent, we thus have that
Ph [Gt] = Ph
[
W it
]n
= e−q·
n
n−1
·t+o(t).(7)
Consequently, the rate rg of the event Gt that all agents take the wrong action in all periods
up to time t is
rg =
n
n− 1q.
We note that this rate can often be calculated explicitly. For example, for Normal private
signals a straightforward calculation shows that
rg = 4
(n−√n)2
(n− 1)2 ra.
Finally, a convexity argument yields that this rate is bounded for any number of agents. We
provide the proof in the appendix.
Proposition 2. For any number of agents n it holds that rg < Eh [ℓ].
As the rational groupthink event implies that all agents make a mistake, this provides a
bound on the speed of learning, conditioned on Θ = h:
Ph
[
ait 6= αh
] ≥ Ph [Gt] = e−rg·t+o(t).
Performing the corresponding calculation when conditioning on the low state, we have proved
Theorem 1, for r¯b = min {Eh [ℓ] ,−El [ℓ]}. In the case of Normal private signals, a tedious
but straightforward calculation shows that r¯b = 4ra.
5. Conclusion
We show that rational groupthink, a form of herding, occurs in a complex environment of
agents who observe each other and take actions repeatedly. As a result, almost all information
is lost when the group of agents is large. We use asymptotic rates as a measure of the speed
of learning. As a robustness test, we show that the same effect holds also in the early periods,
for the case of Normal signals.
This article leaves many open questions which could potentially be analyzed using our
approach. What happens when the state changes over time? What happens with payoff
externalities, for example when agents have incentive to coordinate? Of particular interest
is the study of a more complex societal structure of the agents: how fast do they learn for a
given network of observation, which is not the complete network?
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Appendix A. The cumulant Generating Functions, their Fenchel
Conjugates, and Large Deviations Estimates
Large Deviations of Random Walks. The long-run behavior of random walks has been
studied in large deviations theory. We now introduce some tools from this literature, which
will be crucial to understanding the long-run behavior of agents.
Let X1, X2, . . . be i.i.d random variables with E [Xt] = µ and Yt =
∑t
τ=1Xt the associated
random walk with steps Xt. By the law of large numbers we know that Yt should approxi-
mately equal µ ·t. Large deviation theory characterizes the probability that Yt is much lower,
and in particular smaller than η · t, for some η < µ. Under some technical conditions, this
probability is exponentially small, with a rate λ⋆(η):
P [Yt < η · t+ o(t)] = e−λ∗(η)·t+o(t) ,
or equivalently stated
lim
t→∞
−1
t
logP [Yt < η · t+ o(t)] = λ⋆(η).
The rate λ⋆ can be calculated explicitly and is the Fenchel Conjugate of the cumulant
generating function of the increments
λ⋆(η) := sup
z≥0
(− log E [e−z X1]− η · z) .
The first proof of a “large deviation” result of this flavor is due to Crame´r (1944), who studied
these questions in the context of calculating premiums for insurers. A standard textbook on
large deviations theory is Dembo and Zeitouni (1998).
In this section we provide an independent proof of this classical large deviations result,
and prove a more specialized one suited to our needs. We consider a very general setting:
we make no assumptions on the distribution of each step Xt, and in particular do not need
to assume that it has an expectation.
Denoting X = X1, The cumulant generating function λ is (up to sign, as compared to the
usual definition) given by
λ(z) = − log E [e−z X] .
Note that when the right hand side is not finite it can only equal −∞ (and never +∞).
Proposition 3. λ is finite on an interval I, on which it is concave and on whose interior it
is smooth (that is, having continuous derivatives of all orders).
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Proof of Proposition 3. Note that I contains 0, since λ(0) = 0 by definition. Assume
λ(a) and λ(b) are both finite. Then for any r ∈ (0, 1)
λ(r · a + (1− r) · b) = − log E [e−(r·a+(1−r)·b)·X] = − log E [(e−a·X)r · (e−b·X)1−r] ,
which by Ho¨lder’s inequality is at least r · λ(a) + (1− r) ·λ(b). Hence λ is finite and concave
on a convex subset of R, or an interval. We omit here the technical proof of smoothness; it
can be found, for example, in Stroock (2013, Theorem 1.4.16). 
It also follows that unless the distribution of X is a point mass (which is a trivial case), λ
is strictly concave on I. We assume this henceforth. Note that it could be that I is simply
the singleton [0, 0]. This is not an interesting case, and we will show later that in our setting
I is larger than that.
The Fenchel conjugate of λ is given by
λ⋆(η) = sup
z≥0
λ(z)− η · z.
We note a few properties of λ⋆. First, since λ(0) = 0 and λ(z) < ∞, λ⋆ is well defined
and non-negative (but perhaps equal to infinity for some η). Second, since λ is equal to
−∞ whenever it is not finite, the supremum is attained on I, unless it is infinity. Third,
since λ is strictly concave on I, λ(z) − η · z is also concave there, and so the supremum is
a maximum and is attained at a single point z ∈ I whenever it is finite. Additionally, since
λ is smooth on I, this single point z satisfies λ′(z) = η if z > 0 (equivalently, if λ⋆(η) > 0).
I.e., if λ′(z) = η for some z in the interior of I then
(8) λ∗(η) = λ(z)− η · z.
Finally, it is immediate from the definition that λ∗ is weakly decreasing, and it is likewise
easy to see that it is continuous. This, together with (8) and the fact that λ′ is decreasing,
yields that λ⋆(η) = λ(0) = 0 whenever η ≥ supz≥0 λ′(z). We summarize this in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. Let I be the interval on which λ is finite, and let I⋆ = {η : ∃z ∈ intI s.t. λ′(z) = η}.
Then
(1) λ∗ is continuous, non-negative and weakly decreasing. It is positive and strictly
decreasing on I∗.
(2) λ⋆(η) = 0 whenever η ≥ supz≥0 λ′(z).
(3) If η ∈ I⋆ and λ′(z) = η then λ∗(η) = λ(z)− η · z.
Given all this, we are ready to state and prove our first large deviations theorem.
Theorem 3. For every η such that η > infz∈I λ′(z) it holds that
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P [Yt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] = e−λ⋆(η)·t+o(t).
Proof of Theorem 3. For the upper bound, we use a Chernoff bound strategy: for any
z ≥ 0
P [Yt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] = P
[
e−z Yt ≥ e−z·(η·t+o(t))] ,
and so by Markov’s inequality
P [Yt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] ≤
E
[
e−z Yt
]
e−z·(η·t+o(t))
·
Now, note that E
[
e−z Yt
]
= e−λ(z)·t, and so
P [Yt ≤ η · t + o(t)] ≤ e−(λ(z)−z·η)·t+z·o(t).
Choosing z ≥ 0 to maximize the coefficient of t yields
P [Yt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] ≤ e−λ⋆(η)·t+o(t),
which is the desired lower bound.
We now turn to proving the upper bound. Denote by ν the law of X , and for some fixed
z in the interior of I (to be determined later) define the probability measure ν˜ by
dν˜
dν
(x) =
e−zx
E [e−zX ]
= eλ(z)−zx,
and let X˜t be i.i.d. random variables with law ν˜. Note that
E
[
X˜
]
=
E
[
Xe−zX
]
E [e−zX ]
= λ′(z).
Now, fix any η1, η2 such that η1 < η2 < η and λ
′(z) = η2 for some z in the interior of I; this
is possible since η > infz∈I λ′(z). This is the z we choose to take in the definition of ν˜. If we
think of η2 as being close to η then the expectation of X˜ , which is equal to η2, is close to η.
We have thus “tilted” the random variable X , which had expectation µ, to a new random
variable with expectation close to η.
We can bound
P [Yt ≤ η · t + o(t)] ≥ P [η1 · t ≤ Yt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] =
∫ ηt+o(t)
η1t
1 dν(t),
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where ν(t) is the t-fold convolution of ν with itself, and hence the law of Yt. It is easy to
verify20 that dν(t)(y) =ezy−λ(z)·t dν˜(t)(y), and so
= e−λ(z)·t
∫ ηt+o(t)
η1t
ezy dν˜(t)(y),
which we can bound by taking the integrand out of the integral and replacing y with the
lower integration limit:
≥ e(η1p−λ(z))·t
∫ ηt+o(t)
η1t
1 dν˜(t).
Since the law of Y˜t =
∑t
τ=1 X˜t is ν˜
(t), this is equal to
= e(η1z−λ(p))·tP
[
η1 · t ≤ Y˜t ≤ η · t+ o(t)
]
.
Since η1 < E
[
X˜
]
< η we have that limt P
[
η1 · t ≤ Y˜t ≤ η · t + o(t)
]
= 1, by the law of large
numbers. Hence
lim inf
t→∞
1
t
log P [Yt ≤ η · t + o(t)] ≥ η1z − λ(z),
which, by (8), and recalling that z = (λ′)−1 (η2), can be written as
lim inf
t→∞
1
t
log P [Yt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] ≥ −λ∗(η2)− (η2 − η1) · (λ′)−1 (η2).
Taking the limit as η1 approaches η2 yields
(9) lim inf
t→∞
1
t
logP [Yt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] ≥ −λ∗(η2).
We now consider two cases. First, assume that η ≤ supz≥0 λ′(z). In this case we can choose
η2 arbitrarily close to η, and by the continuity of λ
∗ we get that
lim inf
t→∞
1
t
log P [Yt ≤ η · t + o(t)] ≥ −λ⋆(η),
or equivalently
P [Yt ≤ η · t+ o(t)] ≥ e−λ⋆(η)·t+o(t).
The second case is that η > supz≥0 λ
′(z). In this case λ⋆(η) = 0 (Proposition 4). Also, (9)
holds for any η2 < supz λ
′(z) and thus it holds for η2 = supz≥0 λ
′(z). But then λ⋆(η2) = 0 =
λ⋆(η), and so we again arrive at the same conclusion. 
The next proposition is similar in spirit, and in some sense is stronger than the previous,
as it shows that the same rate applies to the event that the sum is below the threshold at
all time periods prior to t, rather than just at period t. It furthermore does not require
20See, e.g., Durrett (1996, Page 74) or note that the Radon-Nikodym derivative between the law of X and X˜
is ezx−λ(z), and so the derivative between the laws of (X1, . . . , Xt) and
(
X˜1, . . . , X˜t
)
is ez(x1+···+xt)−λ(z)·t.
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the threshold to be linear, but only asymptotically and from one direction; both of these
generalizations are important.
Proposition 5. For every η such that η > infz∈I λ′(z), and every sequence {yt}t∈N with
lim inft yt/t = η and P [Yt ≤ yt] > 0 it holds that
P
[∩tτ=1 {Yτ ≤ yτ}] = e−λ⋆(η)·t+o(t).
Proof of Proposition 5. Let Et be the event ∩tτ=1 {Yτ ≤ yτ}. Let {tk} be a sequence such
that limk ytk/tk = η. For every t let t
′ be the largest tk with tk ≤ t. Then by inclusion we
have that
1
t
log P [Et] ≤ 1
t′
log P [Yt′ ≤ yt′] .
Using the same Chernoff bound strategy of the proof of Theorem 3, we get that
1
t
logP [Et] ≤ −λ⋆ (yt′/t′) .
The continuity of λ implies that taking the limit superior of both sides yields
lim sup
t
1
t
log P [Et] ≤ −λ⋆ (η) ,
or
P [Et] ≤ e−λ⋆(η)·t+o(t).
To show the other direction, define (as in the proof of Theorem 3) X˜t to be be i.i.d. random
variables with law ν˜ given by
dν˜
dν
(x) = eλ(z)−zx,
where ν is the law of X , and z ∈ I is chosen so that λ′(z) = η2 for some η1 < η2 < η.
Denoting ǫ = η − η1, it follows from inclusion that
P [Et] ≥ P [Et ∩ {Yt ≥ yt − ǫ · t}] .
Now, the Radon-Nikodym derivative between the laws of (X1, . . . , Xt) and
(
X˜1, . . . , X˜t
)
is
ez(x1+···+xt)−λ(z)·t. Hence
P [Et] ≥ E [1Et · 1Yt≥yt−ǫ·t] = E
[
1E˜t · 1Y˜t≥yt−ǫ·t · ezY˜t−λ(z)·t
]
,
where E˜t is the event ∩tτ=1
{
Y˜τ ≤ yτ
}
. We can bound this expression by taking ezY˜t−λ(z)·t
out of the integral and replacing it with the lower bound yt − ǫ · t. This yields
P [Et] ≥ ez(yt−ǫ·t)−λ(z)·t · P
[
E˜t ∩
{
Y˜t ≥ yt − ǫ · t
}]
.
Since the expectation of Y˜t/t is strictly between η = lim inft yt/t and η − ǫ, we have that
limt P
[
Y˜t ≥ yt − ǫ · t
]
= 1 by the weak law of large numbers. By the strong law of large
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numbers and the Markov Property of
{
Y˜t
}
we have that limt P
[
E˜t
]
> 0;
{
Y˜t
}
is indeed
Markov since
{
X˜t
}
are i.i.d. Thus limt P
[
E˜t ∩
{
Y˜t ≥ yt − ǫ · t
}]
> 0 and
lim inf
t
−1
t
logP [Et] ≤ z · η1 − λ(z) .
Proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 3 yields that
P [Et] ≥ e−λ⋆(η)·t+o(t) . 
Appendix B. Application of Large Deviation Estimates
In this section we prove a number of claims regarding the functions λθ and λ
∗
θ. Recall that
for θ ∈ {h, l}
λh(z) := − log Eh
[
e−z ℓ
]
λl(z) := − log El
[
ez ℓ
]
,
where ℓ is a random variable with the same law as any ℓit, and
λ⋆θ(η) = max
z
λθ(z)− η · z.
We first note that by the definition of λθ we have that
(10) λh(z) = − log
∫
exp
(
−z · log dµh
dµl
(s)
)
dµh(s) = − log
∫ (
dµl
dµh
(s)
)z
dµh(s).
It follows immediately that there is a simple connection between λh and λl
λl(z) = λh(1− z).
Furthermore, as for every η between Eh [ℓ] and El [ℓ] the maximum in the definition of λ
⋆
h is
achieved for some z ∈ (0, 1), it follows that there is also a simple connection between λ⋆h and
λ⋆l :
(11) λ⋆l (η) = λ
⋆
h(−η)− η.
We will accordingly state some results in terms of λh and λ
⋆
h only. It also follows from (10)
that the interval I on which λh is finite contains [0, 1]. Since from the definitions we have
that λ′h(0) = Eh [ℓ], and since λ
′
h(1) = El [ℓ] by the relation between λh and λl, we have
shown the following lemma.
Lemma 4. λθ(z) and λ
⋆
θ(η) are finite for all z ∈ [0, 1] and η ∈ (El [ℓ] ,Eh [ℓ]). Furthermore,
(12) λh(z) = λl(1− z) and λ∗h(η) = λ∗l (−η)− η .
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Proof of Lemma 2. Given Lemma 4, Lemma 2 is an immediate corollary of Theorem
3. 
The following simple observation will be useful on several occasions:
Lemma 5. Let ra = λ
⋆
h(0). Then ra = maxz∈(0,1) λh(z) = maxz∈(0,1) λl(z) = λ
∗
l (0), ra <
min {Eh [ℓ] ,−El [ℓ]}, and min {λ⋆h(ra), λ⋆l (ra)} > 0.
Proof of Lemma 5. That ra = maxz∈(0,1) λh(z) = maxz∈(0,1) λl(z) = λ∗l (0) follows immedi-
ately from the definitions. Now, note that Eh [ℓ1] = λ
′
h(0). Thus ra < Eh[ℓ] is a simple con-
sequence of the fact that ra = λ
⋆
h(0) = maxz≥0 λ(z), that this maximum is obtained in (0, 1),
and that λh is strictly concave. It follows from the same considerations that ra < −El [ℓ] .
Finally, by Proposition 4, λ⋆h(ra) > 0 as λ
′
h(0) < ra < λ
′
h(1). The same arguments show that
ra < −El [ℓ1] and λ⋆l (ra) > 0. 
Proof of Fact 1. Consider the case Θ = h. As shown in Lemma 1 the probability that
the agent makes a mistake is equal to the probability that the LLR is below L(αh). Thus,
Lemma 2 allows us to characterize this probability explicitly:
Ph
[
ait 6= αθ
]
= Ph
[
Rit ≤ L(αh)
]
= Ph
[
Rit ≤ o(t)
]
= e−λ
⋆
h
(0)·t+o(t) .
An analogous argument yields that Pl
[
ait 6= αθ
]
= e−λ
⋆
l
(0)·t+o(t). By (12) λ⋆h(0) = λ
⋆
l (0) . 
Appendix C. Many Agents
We define for each t the action αmint to be the lowest action (i.e., having the lowest L(α))
that is taken by any agent with positive probability at time t, and observe that αmint is equal
to αl for all t large enough. We define
Gt = ∩ni=1 ∩tτ=1
{
aiτ = α
min
τ
}
.
Proof of Lemma 3. Note first, that each agent chooses action αmin1 in the first period if
the likelihood ratio she infers from her first private signal is at most L(αmin1 ). Hence
G1 =
⋂
1≤i≤n
{ai1 = αmin1 } =
⋂
1≤i≤n
{Ri1 ≤ L(αmin1 )}.
Thus G1 is an intersection of conditionally independent events. Assume now that all agents
choose the action αminτ up to period t−1; that is, that Gt−1 has occurred, which is a necessary
condition for Gt. What would cause any one of them to again choose α
min
t at period t? It
is easy to see that there will be some threshold qit such that, given Gt−1, agent i will choose
αmint if and only if her private likelihood ratio P
i
t is lower than q
i
t. By the symmetry of the
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equilibrium, qit is independent of i, and so we will simply write it as qt. It follows that
Gt = Gt−1 ∩
⋂
1≤i≤n
{Rit ≤ qt}.
Therefore, by induction, and if we denote q1 = L(α
min
τ ), we have that
Gt =
⋂
τ≤t
1≤i≤n
{Riτ < qτ}.
Now, note that the event that agent i chooses αminτ in all periods is not independent of the
event that some other agent j does the same. Still, by rearranging the above equation we
can write Gt as an intersection of conditionally independent events:
Gt =
⋂
1≤i≤n
( ⋂
1≤τ≤t
{Riτ ≤ qτ}
)
,
and if we denote
W it =
⋂
1≤τ≤t
{Riτ ≤ qτ},
then the W it ’s are conditionally independent, and
Gt =
⋂
1≤i≤n
W it . 
Proposition 6. The threshold qt is characterized by the recursive relation
(13) qt = L(α
l)− (n− 1) · log Ph
[
W 1t−1
]
Pl
[
W 1t−1
] and W it = ⋂
1≤τ≤t
{Riτ ≤ qt} .
Proof of Proposition 6. Agent 1’s log-likelihood ratio conditional on ∩ni=1W it−1 at time t
equals b
L1t = R
1
t + log
Ph
[∩ni=1W it−1]
Pl
[∩ni=1W it−1] .
Since the W it−1’s are conditionally independent, we have that
L1t = R
1
t +
n∑
i=1
log
Ph
[
W it−1
]
Pl
[
W it−1
] .
Finally, by symmetry, all the numbers in the sum are equal, and
L1t = R
1
t + (n− 1) · log
Ph
[
W 1t−1
]
Pl
[
W 1t−1
] .
28
Now, the last addend is just a number. Therefore, if we denote
qt = L(α
l)− (n− 1) · log Ph
[
W 1t−1
]
Pl
[
W 1t−1
] ,(14)
then
L1n = R
1
t − qt + L(αl),
and L1t ≤ L(αl) (and thus a1t = αl) whenever P 1t ≤ qt. 
Lemma 6. qt ≥ L(αmint ) for all t.
Proof of Lemma 6. Let Fh and Fl be the cumulative distribution functions of a private
log-likelihood ratio ℓ, conditioned on Θ = h and Θ = l, respectively. Then it is easy to see
that Fh stochastically dominates Fl, in the sense that Fl(x) ≥ Fh(x) for all x ∈ R. It follows
that the joint distribution of {Riτ}τ≤t conditioned on Θ = h dominates the same distribution
conditioned on Θ = l, and so Ph [W
1
t ] ≤ Pl [W 1t ]. Hence qt ≥ L(αmint ). 
Lemma 7. There is a constant C > 0 such that Pl [W
1
t ] ≥ C for all t.
Proof of Lemma 7. Since the events W 1t are decreasing, we will prove the lemma by show-
ing that
lim
t→∞
Pl
[
W 1t
]
> 0,
which by definition is equivalent to
lim
t→∞
Pl
[∩τ≤t {Riτ ≤ qτ}] > 0.
Since qt ≥ L(αmint ), it suffices to prove that
lim
t→∞
Pl
[∩τ≤t {Riτ ≤ L(αminτ )}] > 0.
To prove the above, note that agents eventually learn Θ, since the private signals are
informative. Therefore, conditioned on Θ = l, the limit of Rit as t tends to infinity must be
−∞. Thus, with probability 1, for all t large enough it does hold that R1t ≤ L(αminτ ). Since
each of the events W 1t has positive probability, and by the Markov property of the random
walk R1t , it follows that the event ∩τ
{
Riτ ≤ L(αminτ )
}
has positive probability. Finally, by
monotonicity
lim
t→∞
Pl
[
W 1t
]
> Pl
[∩τ {Riτ ≤ L(αminτ )}] > 0.

It follows immediately from this Lemma 7 and Proposition 6 that
(15) lim
t→∞
qt
t
= −(n− 1) lim
t
1
t
log Ph
[
W 1t−1
]
,
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provided that the limit exists.
Let q = lim inft→∞ qt/t. Since W it = ∩tτ=1 {Riτ ≤ qτ}, it follows from Proposition 5 that
− lim t→∞1
t
logPh
[
W it
]
= λ⋆h(q),
provided that q > infz λ
′
h(z). But q ≥ 0 (Lemma 6), and so this indeed holds. Thus, by
(15), we have proved the following proposition:
Proposition 7. The limit q = limt→∞
qt
t
exists, and
q = (N − 1)λ⋆h(q) .
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall that λ⋆h is strictly convex, and that λ
⋆
h(D) = 0, where we
denote D = Eh [ℓ] . Hence
λ⋆h(q) <
q
D
λ⋆h(D) +
D − q
D
λ⋆h(0)
=
D − q
D
λ⋆h(0).
Substituting (n− 1)λ⋆h(q) for q and simplifying yields
λ⋆h(q) <
D
D/λ⋆h(0) + n− 1
.
Since λ⋆h(0) < D (Lemma 5) we have shown that
nλ⋆h(q) < D,
and so
n
n− 1q = nλ
⋆
h(q) < D . 
We now turn to proving Proposition 1, which states that conditioned on rational group-
think—that is, conditioned on the event Gt—all agents have, with high probability, a private
LLR Rit that strongly indicates the correct action. In fact, we prove a stronger statement,
which implies Proposition 1: the private LLR is arbitrarily close to q · t, the asymptotic
threshold for Rit above which rational groupthink ends.
Proposition 8. For every ǫ > 0 it holds that
lim
t→∞
Ph
[
Rit > t · (q − ǫ) for all i | Gt
]
= 1,
where, as above, q is the solution to q = (n− 1)λ⋆h(q).
Proof. By Theorem 3 we know that
lim t→∞ − 1
t
log Ph
[
Rit ≤ t · (q − ǫ)
]
= λ⋆h(q − ǫ).
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Since λ⋆h(q − ǫ) > λ⋆h(q) it follows that
lim t→∞ − 1
t
log Ph [At] = n · λ⋆h(q − ǫ) > n · λ⋆h(q),
where At is the event {Rit ≤ t · (q − ǫ) for all i}. Since for t high enough the event At is
included in Gt, and since
lim t→∞ − 1
t
logPh [Gt] = n · λ⋆h(q),
it follows that Ph [At | Gt] decays exponentially with t. Hence Ph [Act | Gt]→t 1, which is the
claim we set to prove. 
Appendix D. Early Period Mistake Probabilities
We now prove Theorem 2. We assume that each agent i observes a Normal signal sit ∼
N (mθ, n) with mean
mΘ =

+1 if Θ = h−1 if Θ = l
and variance n.21 Note, that for any number of agents the precision of the joined signal equals
1, and thus the total information the group receives every period is fixed, independent of n.
We assume that the prior belief assigns probability one-half to each state p0 = 1/2 and
that there are two actions A = {l, h} and each agent just wants to match the state, as in
the “matching the state” example (Section 2.5.1). As in the first period each agent bases
her decision only on her own private signal, she takes the action h whenever her signal si1 is
greater than 0 and the action l otherwise:
ai1 =

h s
i
1 > 0
l si1 ≤ 0
.
The private likelihood of each agent after observing the first t signals is given by
Rit = log
∏t
τ=1 exp
(
−(s
i
τ−1)
2
2n
)
∏t
τ=1 exp
(
− (siτ+1)2
2n
)
=
2
n
t∑
τ=1
siτ .
21All results generalize to non-symmetric means, since only the difference |mh − ml| enters the Bayesian
calculations.
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The probability that an agent takes the correct action Θ in period 1 (conditional only on
her own first period signal) is thus given by
Ph
[
Θ = ai1
]
= Ph
[
si1 ≥ 0
]
= 1− Φ
(−mh√
n
)
= Φ
(
1√
n
)
.
By symmetry, Pl[a
i
1 = Θ] = Φ(1/
√
n) as well. Denote πn = Φ
(
1√
n
)
and by w1 = |{i ∈
n : ai1 = h}| the number of agents taking the action ai1 = h. Let κn = log(πn/(1 − πn)), and
note that 2/
√
n ≥ κn ≥ 1/√n.
As the action of each agent is independent, the LLR of agent i at the beginning of period
2 is given by
Li2 =
2
n
2∑
τ=1
siτ − (2w1 − n) κn − sgn(si1) κn .
We define the private part of the LLR at the beginning of period 2 as
Rˆi2 =
2
n
2∑
τ=1
siτ − sgn(si1) κn
and the public part of the LLR as
Lp2 = (2w1 − n) κn .
Let αm be the action that the majority of the agents chose in the first period (with αm = l
in case of a tie). Note that αm = h iff L
p
2 > 0. Let Et be the event that all agents take the
first period majority action αm in all subsequent periods up to time t, i.e., a
i
s = αm for all
1 < s ≤ t.
Proposition 9. The probability of Et goes to one as the number of agents goes to infinity,
i.e.,
lim
n→∞
P [Et] = 1 .
This is a rephrasing of Theorem 2. We in fact provide a finitary statement and prove that
P [Et] ≥ 1− 20 · t ·
√
logn
n
.
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We first show that the the probability of the event E2 that all agents take the same action
in period 2 goes to one. The LLR of agent i at the beginning of period 2 is given by
Li2 =
2
N
2∑
τ=1
siτ + (2w1 − n) κn − sgn(si1) κn .
= Rˆi2 + L
p
2 .
To show that E2 has high probability we show that with high probability it holds that L
p
2,
the public belief induced by the first period actions, is large (in absolute value) and that the
private beliefs are all small. Intuitively, this holds since both are (approximately) zero mean
Normal, with Lp2 having constant variance and Rˆ
i
2 having variance of order 1/
√
n. It will
then follow that with high probability the signs of Lp2 and L
i
2 are equal for all i, which is a
rephrasing of the definition of E2.
Let A be the event that all of the private signals in the first t periods have absolute values
at most M = 4
√
n log n. Using the union bound (over the agents and time periods), this
happens except with probability at most
P [Ac] ≤ t · n · P [|sit| > M] ≤ t · n · 2 · Φ
(
−1
2
M/
√
n
)
;
the 1/2 factor in the argument of Φ is taken to account for the fact that the private signals
do not have zero mean. Since Φ(−x) < e−x22 for all x < −1, we have that
P [Ac] ≤ 2 · t
n
.
Let
Rˆiτ =
2
n
τ∑
τ ′=1
siτ ′ − sgn(si1) κn.
Thus the event A implies that
|Rˆiτ | ≤
2
n
· t ·M + κn ≤ 8 · t ·
√
log n
n
+
2√
n
≤ 9 · t ·
√
log n
n
.
Let B be the event that the absolute value of the public LLR Lp2 is at least 9 · t ·
√
logn
n
;
this is chosen so that the intersection of A and B implies E2. Conditioned on Θ = h,
the random variable w1 has the unimodal binomial distribution B(n, πn), which has mode
⌊(n + 1) · πn⌋. The probability at this mode is easily shown to be at most 1/
√
n. The same
applies conditioned on Θ = l. It follows that the probability of Bc, which by definition is
equal to the probability that |w1− n/2| ≤ 1κn9 · t ·
√
logn
n
, is at most 2
κn
9 · t ·
√
logn
n
times the
33
probability of the mode, or
P [Bc] ≤ 2
κn
9 · t ·
√
log n
n
· 1√
n
≤ 18 · t ·
√
log n
n
.
Together with the bound on the probability of A, we have that
P [A and B] ≥ 1− 20 · t ·
√
log n
n
,
and in particular
P [E2] ≥ 1− 20 ·
√
log n
n
.
We now claim that A ∩ B implies Et. To see this, note that as A ∩ B implies E2, the
agents all observe at period 2 that no other agent has a strong enough signal to dissent
with the first period majority. This only strengthens their belief in the first period majority,
requiring them an even higher (in absolute value) threshold than Lp2 to choose another action;
the formal proof of this statement is identical to the proof of Lemma 6. But since, under
the event A∩B, each of their private LLRs Rˆiτ is weaker than Lp2 for all τ ≤t, they will not
do so at period 3, or, by induction, in any of the periods prior to period t. This completes
the proof of 9, and thus of Theorem 2.
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